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Abstract 
Much attention has focussed on the severity of the sentences imposed following the 2011 
‘summer rioting’ in England. The Court of Appeal confirmed that participation in a 
collective outbreak of disorder takes offending outside the sentencing guidelines. The 
position for sentencing riot-related offending in future is unclear, however, as the Court 
gave no indication of how to calibrate this departure, and the Sentencing Council has 
made offending during public disorder an aggravating factor only in its burglary 
guideline. This article explores new empirical evidence regarding the sentences imposed 
in Manchester, together with national Ministry of Justice data, to demonstrate for the first 
time how this ‘uplift’ effect was a feature throughout the criminal process, from arrest to 
sentence. 
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Introduction 
The disorder which occurred in England in 2011 was quickly dubbed ‘the consumer riots’. 
As explanations were sought for the disturbances, ‘the same predictable debate sprang 
up in politics, popular culture and academia’ (Hall 2012:146) as to whether the riots were 
a political reaction against social exclusion, poverty and discriminatory policing; the 
actions of ‘defective and disqualified consumers’ (Bauman 2011; Akram 2014; Treadwell 
et al 2013:1); or a product of broken homes, moral decline and gang culture - what the 
Prime Minister condemned as ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Cameron 2011: Col. 1051). 
Much less attention has been given to the responses of the criminal justice system. The 
judiciary not only increased the penalties imposed on rioters but also abandoned the 
sentencing guidelines that should have acted as a restraint on its punitive impulses 
(Roberts 2012; Ashworth 2012). Whilst these exemplary sentences attracted concern, 
this article offers an empirically-grounded analysis of how the uplift in sentencing was a 
feature of every stage of the process for riot-related offending; a factor that does not 
appear to have been considered in determining the greater quantum in sentencing or in 
analyses of the sentences. As Stenning has argued, ‘the sentencing process may be more 
realistically conceived as beginning with the decision to lay charges and ending with the 
completion of any sentence imposed, rather than simply as a stage in the trial process that 
follows the verdict or guilty plea’ (2008:197). Thus the sentences imposed need to be 
considered in the context of police decision making and, in particular, the increasingly 
proactive and adversarial involvement of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Finally 
                                                             
1 Authors are arranged alphabetically. We would like to thank Professor Julian Roberts, Professor 
Kieran McEvoy, Dr Elaine Dewhurst and the BJC reviewers for their helpful comments. We are 
grateful to the Manchester Evening News for sharing its data; the views expressed are our own. 
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the article demonstrates the lacuna in guidance following the Court of Appeal judgment 
in Blackshaw (2011) and the Sentencing Council’s Guideline on Burglary (2011) to argue 
for a more carefully calibrated approach to future sentencing involving offences occurring 
during periods of social disorder. 
The Background 
On Thursday 4 August 2011, armed Metropolitan Police officers shot dead a suspect 
named Mark Duggan. Following peaceful protests about this event, disturbances broke 
out in Tottenham, north London, on the evening of Saturday 6 August. The disorder 
spread across 22 boroughs in the capital and to 20 police force areas in other English 
cities, ending in the early hours of Wednesday 10 August. Five people died, more than 300 
police officers were injured, 2,584 commercial premises were attacked, and at least 231 
crimes against domestic properties were recorded (HMIC 2011:13). The total costs 
including policing, clean-up operations, damage to property, losses to business and lost 
tourism revenue, are estimated to be in the region of half a billion pounds (Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel 2012).  
In the year following the riots, 3,103 prosecutions were brought in relation to these 
events. By 31 August 2012, of the 2,158 convicted, all but twenty had been sentenced 
(Ministry of Justice 2012b). The vast majority of offending took place in London, followed 
by the West Midlands and Greater Manchester (MoJ 2012b). Although the overall 
offending profiles were similar in the three main areas (see Figure 1), this obscures the 
much more serious crimes that also took place in London and Birmingham.2  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Although shocking, the events were not unprecedented. There were riots across several 
English cities in 1981 and 1985 (Scarman 1981; Silverman 1986); in Bradford in 1995 
and again, along with several mill towns, in 2001 (Amin 2003; King and Waddington 
2004); and Birmingham in 2005 (King 2013). There had also been demonstrations in 
London in the previous year against both student tuition fees and public sector cuts that 
had ended in violence (Lewis et al 2010; BBC 27 March 2011). Whilst some of the disorder 
and the responses to it appeared familiar, ‘the days following the initial disturbances in 
Tottenham saw evidence of a type of systematic looting that did not appear to fit with 
previous experience’ (Lewis et al 2011:8). Although the disturbances in London were 
initially associated with the Duggan shooting and the police handling of the situation, in 
comparison with previous riots, in most places, the majority of those involved seemed not 
to want to engage with the police, and the focus of the disturbances was primarily 
acquisitive.3 The disorder of August 2011 was ‘unparalleled in terms of the speed, scale 
                                                             
2 The riots came to be defined by the horrifying images from London, such as a woman leaping 
from an upstairs window of her burning home. Examples of these images of the disorder can be 
found at http://www.stylist.co.uk/life/london-riots-the-events-in-pictures. See also the 
newspaper front pages for 9 August 2011 at 
http://www.thepaperboy.com/uk/2011/08/09/front-pages-archive.cfm (last accessed 1 March 
2014). The disturbances in Birmingham raised particular concerns following the deaths of three 
men run over by a car outside a mosque and an attempt to shoot down a police helicopter (BBC 10 
August 2011; Lewis and others 2014). 
3 The much smaller disorders that took place in Nottingham and Merseyside appeared to have a 
different offending profile, involving more disorder and less looting. The Chief Constable of Greater 
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and geographical spread of disorder’ (HMIC 2011:16). The media coverage was also 
unmatched, with continuous reporting and commentary from traditional news outlets 
and the increased use of social media (Hohl et al 2013:13). ‘The endurance of the 
judiciary, prosecutors and defence lawyers; the capacity of cells and the prisoner escort 
service; the resourcefulness of court staff; even knowledge of the law: all were tested as 
never before’ (Bawdon and Bowcott 2012). In response, the courts introduced all-night 
and weekend sittings to deal with the numbers in custody that were praised by some, but 
others criticised ‘the unprecedented night sittings describ[ing] them as kangaroo courts, 
dispensing "conveyor-belt justice"’ (Bawdon and Bowcott 2012). This in turn put 
pressure on defence representatives and the probation service at a time of year when 
most agencies are short-staffed due to summer holidays. A significant strain was also put 
on the prison estate (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales 2012).  
Sentencing formed an immediate and highly politicised part of the public debate about 
the riots. Initial claims were made that suggested many of those involved did not fear 
conviction as they thought they would ‘only’ get a police caution or community 
punishment (Narain 2011; Smith 2011). The disorder occurred in the context of tension 
in the Conservative Party over, then Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke’s plans to create a 
‘rehabilitation revolution’ in sentencing (Ministry of Justice 2010:1). During the disorder, 
senior politicians were criticised for appearing to suggest how the criminal justice system 
should deal with those involved,4 imperilling ‘the sacrosanct separation of powers 
between the government and the judiciary’ (Carlile 2011), although judges denied 
yielding to such pressure (House of Commons Justice Committee 2011). Media 
commentary seemed polarised between those calling for the courts to ‘send a message’ to 
deter rioters; and shock at the severity of some of the sentences given for minor offences 
(Bowcott et al. 2011; Doyle 2011). Whilst the public seemed to support an increase in 
sentences, they were less punitive than the courts (Hohl et al 2013; Roberts and Hough 
2013).  
Manchester is a useful region to study in terms of the riots. Most of the disorder occurred 
on 9 August, the majority of it in Manchester city centre and Salford Precinct. There were 
incidents of violence in which masked groups of 200-300 people threw missiles, including 
petrol bombs, bricks and fireworks at the emergency services, buses and motorists. 
Vehicles and buildings were set alight and widespread looting of shopping centres took 
place (HMIC 2013). Whilst only 8 per cent (249) of defendants (Ministry of Justice 2012b) 
had a first hearing in Greater Manchester, the area processed the early offenders through 
the courts most quickly.5 In an unprecedented step, the Recorder of Manchester issued a 
form of guidelines for sentencing these cases (Carter & others 2011) that was followed in 
                                                             
Manchester, Sir Peter Fahy said that ‘Certainly most of it in Manchester was about getting goods, 
breaking into places and stealing things. Salford I think was slightly different. It was more about 
attacking us and the fire services’ (Clifton and Allison 2011). 
4 For example, the Prime Minister stated that: ‘Anyone charged with violent disorder and other 
serious offences should expect to be remanded in custody, not let back on the streets; and anyone 
convicted should expect to go to jail’ (Cameron 2011: Col. 1052). 
5 The first defendants were sentenced on 10 August (MEN 11 August 2011). It was also thought to 
be the first area to issue an anti-social behaviour order in relation to the disorder (BBC News 29 
September 2011).  
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other courts; a practice that the Court of Appeal criticised but has not improved upon 
(Blackshaw 2011).  
This article draws upon two data sets: a national and a local one, to explore how the cases 
were dealt with throughout the entire criminal justice process, rather than merely 
focusing on the sentencing outcome. The Ministry of Justice published regular statistical 
bulletins about the riot sentencing (Ministry of Justice 2011, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c). These offer a wealth of demographic detail about offenders, such as age, ethnicity 
and previous convictions. The local data were collected by the court reporters of the 
regional newspaper, the Manchester Evening News (MEN),6 who attended court and 
recorded data on those sentenced in Manchester in relation to the riots between 11 
August 2011 and 9 January 2012. The MEN then shared them with the first named author 
after collection for further analysis.7 We had no control over the data collection and were 
told that the 110 cases provided a complete census. Having compared the data with the 
Ministry of Justice figures, we realised that that data were incomplete. Further 
exploration of these missing cases established that the data relate to about 63% of the 
total who appeared in court in Manchester over that period.8 As the offending detail is in 
line with the Ministry of Justice data,9 we are broadly satisfied that rest of the data missing 
is due to the difficulties in managing the overwhelming10 number of defendants, rather 
than excluding any particular type of case, other than juveniles. The MEN data, whilst 
incomplete, offers finer detail and further insight into the processing of these cases by the 
criminal justice system than can be gleaned from the MoJ data alone, so we have included 
it for exploratory and illustrative purposes.  
 
                                                             
6 There is an interesting history of newspapers investigating public disorder. The Guardian-LSE 
study of the 2011 riots was inspired by the collaboration between the Detroit Free Press 
newspaper and Michigan’s Institute for Social Research after the 1967 Detroit riots (Lewis et al. 
2011:9). 
7 See also XXXX (forthcoming).  
8 240 of the 249 cases that were dealt with in Manchester had had first hearings by 1 February 
2012 (MoJ 2012a; MoJ 2012b) and we identified press reports of four cases that concluded 
between the end dates of the MEN and MoJ data collection (9 January and 1 February). Three cases 
were heard at other local magistrates’ courts, and the location was not recorded in two cases (MoJ 
FOI request 5 November 2013, email on file with the authors). The main group missing is the 65 
juvenile defendants (MoJ 2012a) as the press is usually excluded from the youth courts (although 
the reporters managed to get details of nine youth court cases, discussed below). We thus have 
data for 110 out of a possible 175 cases (63%): 66% of adult cases (110 of 166) and an additional 
14% of juvenile cases (n=9).  
9 In both data sets the majority of offences comprised burglary or attempted burglary (56% in the 
MoJ 2012 data and 60% in the MEN data). Theft or handling stolen goods accounted for 13% of the 
MoJ cases compared to 16% classified as theft offences in the MEN. Violent and public order 
offences comprised 21% of the MoJ data and 16% of the MEN data.  
10 Sixty seven per cent of cases of the Manchester cases were dealt with in the first week (MoJ 
2011) and about eighty per cent in the first month (MoJ 2011). One night sitting at Manchester 
Magistrates' Court saw three district judges process defendants in batches of three as they aimed 
to deal with the 117 defendants in custody (BBC 11 August 2011). 
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Decisions relating to Arrest and Charge 
There has been much discussion of the police response to the riots, including their arrest 
decisions (HMIC 2011; Riots, Communities and Victims Panel 2012).11 It is ‘an operational 
decision at the discretion of the individual constable’ whether to arrest a suspect (PACE 
Code G, para 2.4) and there was a very public dispute between the President of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Secretary about this during the riots 
(Newburn 2011). Myriad factors may affect decisions about arrest (see, for example, 
Sanders and Young 2012). On the first night of the disorder, the Metropolitan Police 
adopted a policy of not arresting suspects at the scene due to insufficient staffing levels; 
this changed as more officers were drafted in (Home Affairs Committee 2011: para 41-
47).  
Prosecutorial decisions are also discretionary. The former Attorney General, Sir Hartley 
Shawcross (1951) famously said ‘It has never been the rule in this country - I hope it never 
will be - that suspected criminal offences must automatically be the subject of 
prosecution’. Instead the CPS applies a two-stage test: first, the evidential stage (if there 
is a realistic prospect of conviction); and second whether a prosecution is in the public 
interest. As Stenning (2008) argues, these decisions about arrest and charge affect the 
sentence ultimately passed. In ordinary circumstances, it is unlikely that any of those 
sentenced in relation to the disorder would have been arrested, never mind charged, for 
example for the theft of doughnuts, or accepting a stolen pair of shorts (MEN data).  
There has been remarkably little research undertaken into the practices and cultures of 
the CPS (Kirk 2014, McConville et al 1991; Quirk 2006). The decision in recent years of 
governments to ‘rebalance the system in favour of victims, witnesses and communities’ 
(Home Office 2002) has led to the CPS adopting a higher public profile and putting the 
‘needs of victims and witnesses at the heart of the criminal justice system’ – an approach 
that arguably conflicts with its role as a disinterested prosecutor (Harris 2013). CPS 
decision-making in relation to the riots has largely escaped scrutiny but, in an example of 
‘zealous advocacy’ (Smith 2012) unusual in an English prosecutor, the Chief Crown 
Prosecutor for the north west said: 
Justice, when it’s swift, is most effective; it’s about ensuring that they see the 
shock and awe of the criminal justice system. Because we represent society, 
we want to ensure that society is reflected in our courtrooms and we want 
them to experience what they made us experience (Afzal 2011). 
The Chief Crown Prosecutor for London made the remarkable admission that there had 
been no contingency planning for an event such as the disorder (Bawdon and Bowcott 
2012) but the CPS was swiftly involved in meetings of Cobra, the government's 
emergency committee; the Attorney General; and the senior presiding judge responsible 
for liaising between the judiciary, courts and government departments. In the first week, 
a special CPS unit was set up to deal exclusively with riot cases (Bawden and Bowcott 
2012). 
                                                             
11 Newburn (2013) noted that this was the first time that senior politicians (including the Prime 
Minister, Home Secretary and the Mayor of London) had criticised police performance whilst riots 
were on-going. 
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Decisions relating to charge were taken very quickly during the disorder. The police were 
given a draft form of words to include in the incomplete files they sent to the CPS for 
decisions about charge. They were told to explain that the on-going nature of the disorder 
and the strain on police resources meant that enquiries could not be completed within 
the time limits and to recommend that charging decisions should be based on the lower 
standard of the ‘threshold test’12 (Operation Withern 2011). In guidance issued on 15 
August 2011, the CPS stated that ‘The serious overall impact of the disorder in August 
2011 has been such that prosecution will be in the public interest in all but the most 
exceptional of circumstances’ (2011a). In effect, this statement suggested that a 
substantial policy decision had been made at speed, without consultation that resulted in 
these cases being treated differently to all other types of offending. 
This prosecutorial zeal had a particular effect on young suspects. When deciding whether 
a prosecution is in the public interest, prosecutors (who should be Youth Offender 
Specialists) must take into account the interests of youngsters and should generally divert 
those eligible from prosecution (CPS n.d.). This appears to have been over-ridden in 
relation to the disorder, an approach which is potentially unlawful.13 Of all those 
prosecuted in relation to the disorder, 27 per cent were aged 11-17, with a further 26 per 
cent aged 18-20 (MoJ 2012b:3). No data are given regarding the numbers diverted from 
prosecution but we are aware of cases from the MEN data of very young suspects and 
trivial offences that were pursued. These include an 11 year old who was convicted of 
burglary having stolen a cap from a sports shop, and a 17 year old who, somewhat 
ironically, was convicted of burglary having stolen an 'I Love Mcr' [Manchester] hooded 
top. 
The offence with which a suspect is charged can make a significant difference to sentence. 
Following the riots, most of the property offences related to stealing from commercial 
premises. This could be charged either as theft, which carries a maximum sentence of 
seven years, or as burglary of a non-dwelling, which can attract up to ten years 
imprisonment. The national figures showed that offences were charged as burglary rather 
than theft at a ratio of 3:1 (MoJ 2012c). The CPS issued guidance stating that those who 
take part in public disorder which involves breaking into property intending to cause 
criminal damage or steal, should be charged with burglary in addition to any public order 
offence. The CPS also stated that even those who cannot be shown to have taken part in 
the disorder should be charged with burglary rather than theft, ‘to reflect the 
unwarranted invasion of another's property and the serious context of the offence’ (CPS 
2011a). Such an approach represents a classic example of what Cohen (1985) referred to 
as both ‘net widening’ and ‘mesh thinning’. This labelling does not necessarily accord with 
                                                             
12 This is used to charge a suspect where the prosecutor has reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
has committed the offence but has insufficient evidence to apply the evidential stage of the Full 
Code Test. The prosecutor must have reasonable grounds for believing that further evidence will 
become available within a reasonable period; the seriousness or the circumstances of the case 
justifies the making of an immediate charging decision, and that there are continuing substantial 
grounds to object to bail (CPS 2013:11).  
13 A decision whether to prosecute a youth offender is open to judicial review if it can be 
demonstrated that the decision was made regardless of, or clearly contrary to, a settled policy of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (R v Chief Constable of Kent and another ex parte L, R v DPP ex 
parte B [1991] 93 Cr App R 416). 
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the everyday understanding of burglary. For example, an offender in Manchester walked 
into a patisserie after finding the door open, disliked the taste of an ice cream he had 
made, so handed it to a passer-by. He was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 16 
months imprisonment (Osuh 2011).  
Nobles and Schiff have examined the ‘impossibility of making the same communications 
in different systems’ (2000:1), in particular the media and the criminal justice system, 
which can use the same terminology but understand it in very different ways. During the 
2011 disorder, the criminal justice system dealt with events in the face of intense media 
interest but in dissimilar terms. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a riot as ‘an 
outbreak of active lawlessness or disorder among the populace’ and this was the 
preferred term in the media discourse.14 Section 1 of the Public Order Act 1986 defines 
riot as:  
Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful 
violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such 
as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his 
personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common 
purpose is guilty of riot.  
It is immaterial whether or not the twelve or more people use or threaten unlawful 
violence simultaneously (s2); the common purpose may be inferred from their conduct 
(s3). This definition includes violent conduct towards property (s8(a)). No person (of 
reasonable firmness or otherwise) needs to be present (s4) and it is not necessary for 
injury or damage to occur (s8(b)).  
CPS Guidance affirmed that, although generally riot should be prosecuted only in the most 
exceptional circumstances, ‘the extreme nature and effect of the outbreaks of violence and 
lawlessness that have characterised the August 2011 events are such that the offence of 
Riot merits serious consideration’ (CPS 2011a). Despite the apparent appropriateness of 
the charge, we have found only sixteen reported convictions for riot – all but one relating 
to two specific incidents.15 This differed from the Bradford riots, when the majority of 
over 100 defendants were sentenced for riot (Najeeb and others 2003: para 10). This 
provides a curious situation in which the labelling of offending is down played in relation 
to the associated punishment. To a lay person, the public order offences may sound more 
serious than property offences but the actual punishment is greater, as riot carries a 
maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment and violent disorder five years; both lesser 
sentences than for burglary.  
Bail 
Most defendants awaiting trial or sentence are presumptively entitled to release on bail 
                                                             
14 The British Insurance Brokers Association noted that the Government did not use the term 'riot' 
in any public conversation, suggesting that this may have been to avoid liability under the Riot 
(Damages) Act 1886 (Home Affairs Committee 2011, para 63) – although the government agreed 
shortly after the disorder ended that compensation would be paid (Cameron 2011 col. 1053). 
15 The Ministry of Justice statistics do not distinguish the different public order offences. We found 
sixteen convictions for riot following a search of the major online news websites. Seven were 
convicted in Nottingham for an attack on a police station (BBC 1 June 2012); eight for the incident 
involving the shooting at a police helicopter in Birmingham (Lewis and others 2014). 
8 
 
unless there are substantial reasons to believe that they pose a risk to the public by 
committing further offences, interfering with witnesses or absconding (Bail Act 1976). 
The public disorder, of itself, was not a ground for refusing bail. Wells and Quick observed 
previously that ‘The use of bail conditions as a form of ‘informal’ punishment by the courts 
is thus now well established’ (2010:222). Although remanded in accordance with the 
terms of the Bail Act 1976, as one magistrate cautioned, ‘it can be tempting to treat a 
remand in custody as a first bite at punishing an offender. That is not just wrong, but also 
illegal’ (Bystander 2011). Many of those remanded in custody were young and/or of 
previous good character (21.9% of all suspects and 36.3% of juveniles had no previous 
convictions; MoJ 2012c) and were charged with only minor offences. Neither the MoJ nor 
the MEN data gives detailed information about remand status. Leaked Metropolitan 
Police guidance revealed that ‘a strategic decision has been made… that in all cases an 
application will be made for remand in custody both at the police station, and later at 
court’ (Operation Withern 2011). The Prison Governors Association President claimed 
that magistrates were choosing custody rather than bail at a ‘much greater rate’ but this 
was disputed by the Magistrates’ Association Chairman (BBC 29 August 2011). One 
Manchester-based lawyer thought that ‘there was a blanket decision made in court before 
the first case was ever heard’ to refuse bail (Bawden and Bowcott 2012). There were 
understandable concerns in the context of the on-going disorder that, if bail were granted, 
those released would commit further offences. Prosecutors noted that, once it was clear 
the danger of more riots had passed, objections to bail were dropped in many cases and 
defendants were released pending trial or sentence (Bawden and Bowcott 2012).  
We have no way of telling whether bail was refused for preventative or punitive reasons 
– or a combination of both - but prisoners, many of whom who were ultimately acquitted 
or given a community punishment, spent time remanded in custody, which again, under 
normal circumstances, they would not have done. This additional ‘punishment’ is not 
considered part of the sentencing tariff and has the greatest impact on those who 
committed the least serious offences. If a defendant is given a custodial punishment, time 
served on remand is deducted but, in a case in which the sentence is a community 
punishment or fine, no such allowance can be made. Even one night in custody, for 
someone who has not experienced it before is likely to be a frightening experience 
(Gentleman 2011), even more so given the overcrowding following the riots. 
Venue 
Where a case is dealt with also affects the sentence that can be passed. Summary-only 
offences must be disposed of in a magistrates’ court, with a maximum sentence of six 
months imprisonment (or up to one year for two consecutive sentences) and a £5,000 
fine. Indictable-only cases must be heard before a judge and jury in the Crown Court, with 
sentences of up to life imprisonment in some cases. A category of intermediate offences 
are known as triable either way: defendants can elect to be tried at the Crown Court, or 
can be sent there if the sentencers think their powers are inadequate. During the riots, 
the Magistrates’ Association called for its members’ sentencing powers to be increased to 
one year’s imprisonment so that they could dispose of more cases. Looking at the MEN 
data (Table 1), assuming the same sentences would have been passed by the magistrates 
as were actually imposed at the Crown Court, this would have increased by forty per cent 
the number of cases that could have been dealt with summarily in Manchester, with 
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associated savings in both time and money in processing these cases. (the Ministry of 
Justice figures do not give this level of detail).  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
 
Most of the offences charged during the disorder were triable either way including violent 
disorder,16 theft and burglary. Existing guidance states that burglary of non-dwellings 
should usually be tried summarily unless there are particular aggravating features, which 
did not apply in most of these cases (Ministry of Justice 2013: part V.51.6). In its riots 
guidance, the CPS altered this, stating that ‘Given the wider context and the likely 
sentence, offences of burglary involving the stealing of property from shops or stores, 
even of a seemingly opportunistic nature, are unlikely to be regarded as suitable for 
summary trial’ (CPS 2011a). Again, this is a remarkable ratcheting up of the stakes. 
Magistrates were also told to consider committing cases to the Crown Court if they felt 
their sentencing powers were insufficient (Bowcott and Bates 2011). Nearly two-thirds 
(65 per cent) of riot-related cases were sent to the Crown Court (MoJ 2012b). 
Another factor to be considered is the allocation of cases at the magistrates’ court. Since 
the riot offences usually involved individuals offending in their own communities, the 
claim for involving local representatives —lay magistrates—would appear to be 
compelling (Roberts 2013:236). Anecdotal evidence suggests instead that almost all riot-
related cases dealt with summarily were assigned to district judges (Roberts and Hough 
2013:236). These legally qualified professionals are thought to hear cases more 
expeditiously than lay magistrates do; however, they are also more likely to impose 
custodial sentences (Ipsos MORI 2011).  
All youths should be tried summarily, usually in the youth court, other than those charged 
with grave crimes, specified offences or those charged jointly with an adult. Riot, violent 
disorder and non-residential burglary are not grave crimes. According to the MEN data, 
17 young people were tried by magistrates and two by the Crown Court, without the 
expertise and protections of the youth courts. The two 17 year olds were each sentenced 
at Crown Court to eight months detention for burglary. It is not clear on what basis their 
cases were transferred to Crown Court, as the offences would seem to be at the lower end 
of the spectrum and their sentences fell within the capacity of the youth court.17 Moving 
these cases from the youth courts has additional consequences for young defendants. The 
automatic reporting restrictions that apply in the youth courts to prevent the naming of 
young offenders unless it is thought to be in the public interest (s. 39 Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933) are merely discretionary in the magistrates’ and Crown Court. On 18 
August 2011, the CPS issued guidance advising prosecutors to ask that young defendants 
should be named if it is required in the public interest (CPS 2011). Almost thirty per cent 
of juveniles in the MEN data were named. Once again, usual procedures were departed 
                                                             
16 Although the Charging Standards state that this would rarely be suitable for summary 
disposition (CPS 2011a).  
17 One admitted burgling a city centre newsagents, which had already been attacked, having been 
caught with cigarettes and jewellery. The other had handed herself in to police after her picture 
was publicised. She had ‘gone into [a pawnbrokers] but left empty handed because she didn't see 
anything she wanted’ (MEN data). 
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from with no debate, no explanation of why this was being done and no analysis of the 
potential consequences for the young people involved. 
Sentence  
The courts have to consider certain factors when determining sentence. Section 142 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires those passing sentence to take into account: 
[deserved] punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and reparation to 
victims. The problem with this is that there is no hierarchy or means of deciding which of 
these, often contradictory, factors to apply. Following the riots, judges and magistrates 
were faced with sentencing under intense media and political scrutiny. In the earliest 
cases, especially in Manchester, they were having to pass sentence whilst the disorder 
was ongoing which meant that incapacitation was perhaps more of an issue. Committing 
an offence at a time of social disorder has long been regarded by the courts as deserving 
of greater punishment (Caird 1970). Following the 2001 Bradford riots, the Court of 
Appeal set a descending tariff, starting at ten years imprisonment for ringleaders (Najeeb 
2003). Sentencers in 2011 had to decide by how much they should increase the 
punishment to reflect the context of the disorder. Two factors meant that they could not 
just follow Najeeb. The different nature of most of the offending in 2011 meant that the 
scale was not directly applicable in most cases.18 In addition, since Najeeb, the sentencing 
guidelines had come into effect, but these made no mention of sentencing in relation to 
public disorder.19  
The definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council are supposed to ensure a 
consistent approach to sentencing, whilst allowing flexibility to reflect individual cases. 
Most offences are divided into three categories of severity, with starting points and 
sentence ranges for each level. In determining the offence category, an exhaustive list of 
factors is provided relating to harm and culpability. Sentencers are required to locate the 
appropriate starting point for the offence, and then adjust for any general and individual, 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances (sentencers have discretion as to which factors 
to consider at this stage). In addition, they should make a reduction for a guilty plea; 
consider whether ancillary orders are appropriate or necessary; ensure that the total 
sentence is proportionate to the offending behaviour and that it is properly balanced. 
Sentencers must also follow any relevant sentencing guidelines, ‘unless the court is 
satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so’ (s 125(1) Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009). When a court imposes a sentence of a different type or outside the 
range provided, it must explain its reasons for so doing. 
The riots created ‘an unexpected and unwelcome challenge for the guidelines’ (Roberts 
2013:16). Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service (the agency responsible for courts 
administration) instructed magistrates’ court clerks to advise magistrates to consider 
disregarding normal sentencing guidelines. This had the, apparently counterintuitive, 
justification of ensuring consistency in sentencing across the country (Bowcott 2011). 
Crown Court judges decided to depart from the guidelines as well. Because public 
                                                             
18 Other than Lewis and others (2014). 
19 According to Gilmore (2010) when sentencing those convicted following violent protests outside 
the Israeli Embassy in 2009, the courts followed Najeeb in imposing deterrent sentences. We are 
not aware of any discussion of these cases in relation to the 2011 disorder. 
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disorder was not on the list for determining the offence category, the courts decided that 
the guidelines were not applicable. The courts appeared to disregard, without discussion, 
the overarching Guideline on Seriousness20 that: 
The seriousness of an individual case should be judged on its own dimensions 
of harm and culpability rather than as part of a collective social harm. It is 
legitimate for the overall approach to sentencing levels for particular offences 
to be guided by their cumulative effect. However, it would be wrong to further 
penalise individual offenders by increasing sentence length for committing an 
individual offence of that type (Sentencing Guidelines Council 2004: F 1.38). 
Without the guidelines, there was no indication as to how sentences should be calculated. 
The Sentencing Council declined to publish emergency guidelines (s123 Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009) because some offences would be sentenced before any guidelines could 
be published and others afterwards, which could lead to inconsistency and complicate 
subsequent appeals (Sentencing Council 2012:9).  
In the absence of guidance, the Recorder of Manchester, Judge Gilbart QC, undertook ‘an 
important and interesting initiative’ (Thomas 2011). Having concluded that the disorder 
took the offences ‘completely outside the usual context of criminality,’ he set out the 
higher starting points and ranges of sentences which would be applied in the Crown Court 
at Manchester for riot-related offending, including offences not yet before him (Carter and 
others 2011). Judge Gilbart set as his starting point that ‘any adult offender… must expect 
to lose his or [her] liberty for a significant period’. The sentences were intended to ‘send 
a clear and unambiguous message … which I trust will deter others from engaging in this 
type of behaviour in the future’ (para 11). Although not binding, Judge Gilbart’s comments 
were regarded as ‘persuasive authority’ by judges in the Crown Court at other locations 
(Alagago and others 2011; Twemlow and others 2011).  
Of those tried in relation to the riots, 508 defendants (16%) were acquitted or had their 
cases dismissed (Ministry of Justice 2012b). Of the 2,138 individuals sentenced, 66 per 
cent (n=1405) received an immediate custodial sentence with an average 17.1 months 
(compared to a figure of 3.7 months for similar cases in 2010; MoJ, 2012b). There were 
stark differences in the proportions receiving an immediate custodial sentence and the 
average length of sentences passed the previous year (see Figure 2). The uplift was 
replicated at both magistrates’ courts and Crown Court. At the magistrates’ courts, 36 per 
cent were sentenced to immediate custody compared to 12 per cent for similar offences 
in 2010 and the average custodial sentence rose from 2.5 to 6.6 months. At the Crown 
Court, 85 per cent were sentenced to immediate custody (compared to 33 per cent in for 
similar offences in 2010) and average sentences rose from 11.3 to 19.6 months; a 73 per 
cent increase (MOJ 2012b).  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
                                                             
20 This guideline deals with the general concept of seriousness in the light of the relevant statutory 
provisions and considers how sentencers should determine when sentencing thresholds have 
been crossed when applying the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
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Not only is the public disorder context seen as an aggravating feature in sentencing, but 
also factors that would normally be considered mitigation, such as previous good 
character are given less weight in such circumstances (Najeeb 2003; Blackshaw 2011, 
para 20). Ordinarily the level of culpability would be reduced if the offending was 
spontaneous, or the offender had played only a minor role (Sentencing Guidelines Council 
2004 D 1.17 and D 1.25). Whilst the definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council 
cite ‘age and/or lack of maturity’ as a mitigating factor (Sentencing Council 2011), this 
had little influence on the punishments issued to youngsters. Thirty-eight per cent of 
those sentenced in relation to the riots were juveniles (aged 11-17; MoJ 2012b). Those 
convicted of riot-related offences in the youth courts were six times more likely to be 
given custody than those convicted by the same courts for similar offences in 2010 (MoJ 
2012c). One youth court magistrate interviewed for Reading the Riots claimed the usual 
‘sentencing rulebook’ for children with no previous convictions had been ‘torn up and 
thrown away’ (Bawdon and Bowcott 2012a). In Lewis and others it was held that ‘the 
particular circumstances of this case require the strong message to go out that those, of 
whatever age, who are tempted to become involved in this sort of group offending must 
expect significant deterrent sentences despite their youth’ (2014: para 181). 
The practical implications of this uplift should not be underestimated. Concerns have 
been expressed about the brutalising effects of contact with the criminal justice system 
and incarceration and  (especially for those who were previously of good character), 
which may in turn diminish their chances of reintegration into society on release (see e.g., 
Haney 2013; McAra and McVie 2007). Prosecuting these cases has had additional social 
and familial consequences for defendants, particularly those whose offending would not 
normally have been pursued so vigorously. For example, the man sentenced for stealing 
an ice cream, described above, was recommended for deportation following his sentence, 
along with about 100 others nationwide (Wheatstone 2012). The Leader of Manchester 
City Council said that it would use its powers to evict those living in social housing who 
had been involved or allowed their children to be involved in the disturbances (Leese 
2011). It is not clear to what extent ancillary orders were sought (such as curfews, non-
entry to certain locations), but the CPS guidance emphasised seeking compensation 
orders (CPS 2011a; Section 130 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000).  
As of 10 August 2012, there had been 24 successful appeals against sentence from the 
magistrates’ courts and 13 from the Crown Courts (one had his sentence increased on 
appeal by the Attorney General; MoJ 2012c). The Court of Appeal will not vary a sentence 
merely because it is harsh. It will only alter a sentence if it is ‘manifestly excessive’ (that 
is the sentence was too high given the facts of the offence or in light of any available 
personal mitigation) and/or ‘wrong in principle’ (if the judge made some mistake when 
imposing the sentence). Its judgments, however, allow guidance to be given for 
sentencing future cases, an opportunity that was not fully utilised in these cases. Packer 
argued that appellate decisions are significant ‘because the appellate level of the criminal 
process is where the governing norms are made explicit’ (1963:232) and, in that respect, 
the decisions were more revealing. 
In Blackshaw (2011), the Lord Chief Justice delivered the judgment on ten joined appeals 
relating to the riots (including six appeals from Manchester Crown Court). In upholding 
eight of the sentences, the Court held that those who deliberately participated in these 
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disturbances had committed aggravated crimes. Severe sentences, intended to 
punishment and deter, must follow as any participation in an unlawful or riotous 
assembly derives its gravity from the common and unlawful purpose, which is an 
essential feature in the assessment of culpability and harm. The Court confirmed that, as 
none of the guidelines envisaged the public disorder, sentences beyond the usual range 
were ‘not only appropriate, but… inevitable’ (Blackshaw 2011, para 16).21 It held that 
these are long established principles and ‘Nothing in any sentencing guideline 
undermines them or reduces their application.’ Whilst sentencers should consider any 
relevant guidelines, ‘the aphorism that sentencing guidelines were guidelines not 
tramlines, continued to be fully reflected in the present legislative framework’ (para 14).  
The Court upheld all of the burglary sentences but reduced those for handling stolen 
goods. The distinction appeared to be whether the defendant had played a direct part in 
the disorder (Blackshaw 2011: para 132) or if ‘The defendant's crime stemmed from this 
public disturbance, but it was not intrinsic to it’ (para 140). Whilst deprecating the trial 
judge’s attempts to set ‘ersatz guidelines’ (Roberts 2013:19-20), the Court gave no 
explanation of how cases should be sentenced once they were outside the sentencing 
guidelines. In reasoning that Ashworth describes as ‘strange and unconvincing’ 
(2012:82), the Court made no mention of the ‘interests of justice’ exception, merely 
holding that the requirement to follow the sentencing guidelines does not require ‘slavish 
adherence’ (Blackshaw 2011: para 13). It did not try to explain the quantum of 
punishment (‘a deterrent sentence… was not manifestly excessive’ (para 86); the overall 
sentence was…‘within the appropriate range (para 99); ‘Making due allowances for his 
age and his personal disadvantages, the sentence was within the appropriate range’ (para 
107)). It did not seek to explain how or why these sentences were appropriate, for 
example by examining what the offence would have attracted under normal 
circumstances, then setting an additional penalty for the disorder. The Court did not 
attempt to justify its conclusions with reference to the relevant guidelines or the 
overarching principles, even as a point of departure (Ashworth 2012: 95). No reference 
was made as to why the cases crossed the threshold for custody (s152(2) Criminal Justice 
Act 2003), or how the sentence was of the shortest term commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offences (s153(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003). The criminal justice 
system should be able to justify its decisions on a principled and proportionate basis. 
Whilst the sentences fell within the statutory maxima, they were far in excess of what 
anyone could have forecast– including defence lawyers when advising their clients as to 
their plea. In future riots, it would be difficult to predict a likely sentence based on these 
cases. 
Several other appeals have followed,22 all of which have endorsed Blackshaw (2011). The 
only case in which the Court gave lengthy consideration to appropriate sentences was for 
                                                             
21 The Court has rebuked judges for disregarding inadequate sentencing guidelines in other cases, 
noting the judge’s statutory obligation to take account of the guidelines and holding that ‘their 
reconsideration is a matter for the Sentencing Guidelines Council and not for a trial judge’ 
(Heathcote-Smith and Melton 2011: para 10). 
22 Adam Khan (2012), Anderson (2012), Challinor (2012), Bretherton (2011), Pilgrim (2011)and 
Suleimanov (2013).  
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the considerably more serious conduct in Lewis and others (2014).23 It upheld the 
Blackshaw principle of departing from the guidance, but gave a reasoned explanation as 
to why the sentences were appropriate, including comparisons with previous cases, the 
defendants’ character, involvement, youth and future dangerousness. This was of limited 
utility however as the seriousness of the offending means that it is a ‘case is probably 
unique in the annals of public disorder in this country in recent times’ (para 1).  
Conclusion  
The disorder of August 2011 was commonly described as the worst in living memory due 
to the speed with which it spread over such a wide geographical area. Extensive damage 
was done, primarily to property rather than people, but the riots caused widespread fear 
and a clear desire for ‘something to be done’. Unlike previous riots, there has been no 
systematic public inquiry (Scarman 1981; Gifford 1986) but there are important lessons 
to be learned from the official responses to the situation.  Thus far, attention has focused 
on the police handling of the disorder and the views of those affected. This enquiry needs 
to be broadened in particular to include an appraisal of how each part of the criminal 
justice system contributed to the sentencing ‘escalator’.  
Punishment is analysed largely in terms of sentences handed down by courts. These 
determinations are announced publicly and can be debated and amended for future cases 
if they are seen as inappropriate. Despite its duty to monitor the operation and 
effectiveness of its guidance, including ‘the frequency with which, and the extent to which, 
courts depart from the sentencing guidelines’ (s128 Coroners and Justice Act 2009), the 
Sentencing Council has not commented on or published findings in relation to the courts 
having systematically disregarded its guidance.  
Feinberg describes punishment as ‘a conventional device for the expression of attitudes 
or resentment and indignation … [it] has a symbolic significance largely missing from 
other kinds of penalties’ (1994:73). There is undoubtedly a performative aspect to 
‘judgecraft’ (Moorhead and Cowan 2007; Baum 2006) and judges’ influence depends on 
the reactions of politicians, the legal profession, academia the media and the public react 
(Garoupa and Ginsberg 2009:452). A local reporter who had watched many of the trials 
described them to us as being akin to show trials, with the district judge addressing the 
press gallery as much as the defendants. Judges are influenced by the interaction between 
the legal subculture (their professional norms and guidelines) and the democratic 
subculture (shaped by public opinion; Richardson and Vines 1970). Whilst it is obviously 
important that judges are aware of public opinion, it is particularly important at times of 
widespread panic that they do not become merely ciphers for the loudest voices and 
disregard their professional constraints. Whilst the offending may have been impulsive, 
sentencing should not be. The former Chair of the Criminal Bar Association, Paul Mendelle 
QC cautioned that ‘people get caught up and act out of character, in a similar way, there is 
a danger that the courts themselves may get caught up in a different kind of collective 
hysteria’ (BBC 17 August 2011). Adhering to the guidelines can ‘serve as a “circuit 
                                                             
23 This involved a group breaking into and setting fire to a public house in Birmingham. The police 
were enticed to the scene then fired upon, including at least one shot at a police helicopter. ‘If the 
offences in Blackshaw were serious, what happened here was in an altogether different and far 
more serious league’ (para 167). 
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breaker,” preventing bursts of punitiveness from affecting sentencing practices’ (Roberts 
2013: 15).  
Rather than abandoning the guidelines, the courts could, and arguably should, have 
treated the public disorder as an aggravating factor rather than a reason for abandoning 
the guidelines, thereby threatening both consistency and proportionality in sentencing 
(Roberts 2012). We concur with Roberts that ‘a systematic approach should be followed 
by courts - even when departing from a definitive sentencing guideline’ (2012:440) and 
that this decision should be taken on an individual level rather than as a blanket decision 
that all disorder-related offending should fall outside the existing guidelines. The courts 
are required to sentence within the offence range rather than the category, so the 
aggravating nature of the disorder could have been addressed by sentencing each case as 
though it was in the sentencing category above that in which it would normally have been 
placed to reflect any additional punishment required. With one important distinction, this 
is essentially what the Sentencing Council has done in the new Burglary Offences 
Definitive Guideline, which makes the ‘context of general public disorder’ a factor 
indicating greater harm. This means that the courts will be able to enhance the quantum 
of sentencing in future cases without abandoning all structure. Because the Sentencing 
Council has put this factor in category one, the courts will be obliged to sentence offenders 
more harshly in future – thus the Sentencing Council has added to the punitive escalator. 
Had it been put in category two, sentencers could have used their discretion to adjust 
sentences to reflect individuals’ culpability in the context of the disorder. Some confusion 
remains however. Whilst the Burglary Guideline has been amended so that cases should 
be dealt with within the existing guidelines; no such provision applies to theft, public 
order, arson or sexual offences. It is unclear whether in future the courts would follow 
Blackshaw (2011) in disapplying the guidelines, or extend the Burglary Guideline by 
analogy.  
Sentencing those who commit the most serious conventional riotous offences is relatively 
clear now (Najeeb 2003, Lewis and others 2014). The greatest lack of clarity and it 
appears, the most punitive sentences, may be imposed on those whose conduct, of itself, 
is less serious, but for the riotous context. A closer examination of these cases suggests 
that sentencing cannot be considered in isolation.  
Discretion in the charging and prosecution process is especially significant in 
situations of disorder; typically involving large numbers of people, they invite 
a policy of selective enforcement… Yet the principles on which such a 
selection proceeds at successive stages – arrest, questioning, charge, final 
decision to prosecute – remain unarticulated and thus unaccountable. (Wells 
and Quick 2010:218).  
All the agencies were working under great pressure to restore order and the courts made 
it clear that they saw their role as being to pass enhanced sentences to reinforce notions 
of punishment and deterrence. One factor that has been neglected is the driving impetus 
of the CPS in sentencing, taking decisions that are both enormously significant and largely 
unreviewable. Retribution and deterrence have been pursued by the CPS, a factor not 
analysed in this way hitherto. In their 1991 book, McConville et al described police 
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dominance of the charging process and the CPS as confining itself to testing the sufficiency 
of evidence. The riots illustrated how that has changed.  
Some scholars have contested whether or not the criminal justice apparatus can properly 
be termed a system (Feeney 1985; Pullinger 1985). Sentencing in relation to the riots 
exemplifies this problem. Each stage of the process considered its treatment of the 
offender in isolation; applying an uplift, whether for pragmatic or punitive purposes. The 
impact of this cumulative uplift and its impact on the individual were never considered 
holistically by sentencers. Under normal circumstances, individuals who stole a bottle of 
water or left a premises without having stolen anything would be very unlikely to be 
arrested; if arrested, they probably be cautioned or released; if charged they would rarely 
be remanded in custody; they would be dealt with at the magistrates’ court (or the youth 
court); and if sentenced, they would receive a light sentence. The riot-related offenders 
received an ‘uplift’ at every step of the process – a factor which does not appear to have 
been taken into account in sentencing. As Feeley (1979) argued, ‘the process is the 
punishment’ and this should be taken into consideration in issuing and applying guidance 
for sentencing future riot-related conduct.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of sentences by offence type and area  
Source: figures compiled from data in MoJ 2012c 
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Figure 2: Average custodial sentence in months for offences related to the public 
disorder between 6 and 9 August in England and Wales 
 
Source: figures compiled from MoJ data (2012b) 
 
Table 1: Nature of sentence and length of sentence dispensed by court type in Manchester 
 
Length of 
sentence 
Manchester 
Youth Court 
Manchester 
Magistrates’ 
Manchester 
Crown Court Total 
Unknown 0 4 0 4 
Non-custodial  3 10 1 14 
Under 3 months 0 2(1) 0 2 
3-6 months 2 10 2 (2) 14 
6-12 months 4 4 17 (5) 25 
1-2 years 0 0 39(1) 39 
2-3 years 0 0 9 9 
3-4 years 0 0 2(1) 2 
4-5 years 0 0 1 1 
Total 9 30 (1) 71 (9) 110 
* numbers in parentheses are suspended sentences 
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